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by F.T. Jones, Extension Section Leader
CONSEQUENCES - continued on page 2
Cooperative Extension Service
Biosecurity is a subject that many growers
may feel has been discussed too much.
However, the lack of Biosecurity can dramati-
cally influence virtually everyone in Arkansas.
How can this be?  Read on.
This issue is devoted entirely to
Biosecurity and is intended to clarify the
following questions:
• Why such concern over diseases?
• What diseases concern the industry most?
• What would happen if we had a major
disease outbreak?
• Why do veterinarians deal with diseases as
they do?
• What are the economic consequences of a
major disease outbreak?
We believe that Biosecurity is good
citizenship. At first glance this statement may
seem ridiculous.   However, the economy of
the state depends heavily on the poultry
industry and any reduction in income from
that industry could affect us all.  Thus, I leave
it to you, the reader, to decide.  Is Biosecurity
good citizenship?
Economic Consequences of a
Major Poultry Disease Break
by F.T. Jones, Extension Section Leader
Exports and Industry Success
The poultry industry has experienced
phenomenal growth over the past 40 years
(Figure 1).  Consumers have responded
favorably to this growth and the industry has
benefitted  (Figure 2). The industry has
increased exports of poultry meat dramatically
over the past 20 years (Figure 3).  While these
exports have increased industry income, they
have also made the industry vulnerable to
losses associated with trade disputes and
international politics.
The United States has been a member an
of the Office of International Epizootics (OIE)
for decades.  The OIE organization includes
virtually every major U. S. trading partner.
The purpose of the OIE is to prevent the spread
of major animal diseases (called List A
diseases) through sharing of information.  For
poultry, there are only two List A diseases,
which are Exotic Newcastle and highly
pathogenic Avian Influenza. Although the
prevention of the spread of major animal
diseases is a noble goal, there is a downside
relating to open trade.
The procedures of the OIE dictate that
when an A category disease is confirmed
within a given country, member nations are
not to trade with that country.  This trade ban
remains in effect for six months after the last
positive has been detected.  In other words,
once the disease is totally cleaned up, the
trade ban will remain for an additional six
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CONSEQUENCES - continued from page
1
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CONSEQUENCES - continued on next page 4
months.  In addition, the United States standard protocol when an A category disease is found is
to close the borders of (or quarantine) the state where the disease has been found so no live birds
or products can be moved in or out until the disease has been cleaned up.  This means (obvi-
ously) that the state where the outbreak occurred would likely be stuck with those birds for an
extended period of time.  Holding birds for extended periods would particularly difficult in
major poultry production states.  In Arkansas, for example, there are slightly over 92 broilers
per human at any given time, holding birds for extended periods could be difficult.  Further-
more, because the majority of farm income in Arkansas is tied to poultry production, a quaran-
tine could have major economic consequences for the state.
How much would such a disease break cost the state?  It is difficult, if not impossible to
provide a definite answer to that question.  However, estimates of the cost of a foot and mouth
disease outbreak in California amount to about $3.7 billion.  California researchers also found
that the longer the time between the outbreak and intervention to control the disease, the greater
the cost (Figure 4).
Recent estimates show that in Arkansas, livestock enterprises accounted for 118,641 jobs in
1999 and workers received $3 billion in wages.  Livestock producers added $4.1 billion in value
to the state’s economy.  Poultry accounts for 86% of the value added livestock products pro-
duced in Arkansas.  These data clearly indicate that what affects poultry production and
processing will have a major effect on the economy of Arkansas.  However, it is necessary to
provide some background information to understand the true impact.
Industry Structure and Economic Impact
 I am sure we all realize that vertically integrated companies produce broilers.  The general
structure of a vertically integrated broiler production complex is shown in Figure 5.  It has been
estimated that the initial investment to start an “average” one million bird complex is about $80
million.  Most of this $80 million endeavor is invested in the area immediately surrounding the
complex in the buildings, equipment and supplies.  This capital flows through the local
economy, producing a “ripple effect” so that those not connected with poultry production or
processing see positive economic effects.  These positive effects include the creation of new
jobs.  In fact, it has been recently estimated that when a new complex moves into an area there
are 3.4 jobs created for each job within the complex.
After the complex is established the company continues to pump cash through the local
economy.  On average, each year the company spends more to operate than was required to set
up the complex.   An estimated annual budget for an “average” broiler complex is shown in
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The information in Figures 6 – 8 was developed from data collected by Agri Stats.  By the time pullets are moved to the
laying house, the average broiler company has $5.59 invested per pullet (Figure 6).  Over the life of a breeder flock, the company
invests on the average $0.958 per dozen eggs produced (Figure 7).  When broilers are ready for catching and transport the
company has invested an average of $0.917 per bird.  The costs shown in Figures 6 – 8 do NOT include payments to growers.  If
grower payments are included in these estimates, companies on the average pay $7.22 per pullet, $1.34 per dozen hatching eggs
and $1.15 per broiler.  If this investment stopped or was seriously reduced, many local economies would find themselves in very
difficult circumstances.  Yet the company (obviously) must be able to ship and sell products for capital to continue to flow
through local economies.  Clearly, a major disease outbreak would threaten the company’s ability to conduct business and, in
turn, negatively impact local economies.












Vehicle Operating Costs 645,600
TOTAL $84,808,100
CONSEQUENCES- continued on page 6
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Figure 6. Average Company 
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CONSEQUENCES - continued on page 8
Unknowns in a Major Disease Outbreak
There would (without a doubt) be many unknowns if a
major disease outbreak occurred.  Some of these unknowns
could have a lasting effect on both local and national econo-
mies.
How would a major disease outbreak affect prices for
poultry products?  This question is not easily answered.
However, since there is often an oversupply of poultry
products, a major disease outbreak could reduce the supply of
products, causing prices to rise.  HOWEVER, the price of
birds within the area affected by the outbreak would be 0,
since birds from that area would be destroyed.  Thus, while
poultry companies in other areas could benefit from the
misfortune of others, companies dealing with the outbreak
would take a major economic hit.
How would a major disease outbreak affect consumer
confidence in poultry products?  If consumers believe that the
disease outbreak would endanger their health, they would lose
confidence in poultry products and buy products other than
poultry.  While consumers have not reacted in this manner in
past outbreaks, there is no guarantee about their future
behavior.
Perhaps the most troubling unknown about the conse-
quences of a major disease outbreak involves retaining export
markets.  If such an outbreak occurred and export markets
were lost even temporarily, we would have to win those
markets back once the export ban was lifted.  Given the fact
that some other countries now have lower production costs
than the United States, winning markets back could be an
uphill battle.  Furthermore, the loss of major export markets
would limit industry profitability.
A Worst Case Scenario
Just how bad could conditions get?  Although there are
some unknowns, the illustration in Figure 9 provides some
possible consequences.  If the complex is not able to sell
product, it would not need to make any further bird place-
ments.  This lack of bird placements means that workers in the
processing plant, the hatchery, the feed mill and several other
company units would not be needed so this could result in
massive layoffs.  Obviously, these layoffs would mean loss of
income for workers, growers and all those who provide goods
and services for all involved.  If these layoffs occur, would
workers who form the labor force to staff plants, hatcheries
and feed mills stay around?  Probably not, if they have no
source of income.  This situation would force many people to
default on farm, home and business loans or mortgages,
which, would mean, consequently, that banks and lending
institutions would face the same economic pressures every
other institution has faced and financing for nearly everything
could become scarce.  This lack of financing combined with
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CONSEQUENCES- continued from page 7
the economic situation, would mean that many businesses would fail and that those surviving
businesses would have to drastically reduce the number of workers employed.  Layoffs, exodus
of people, business failures and bank pressures would clearly mean that fewer taxes would be
collected.  The collection of fewer taxes would mean that law enforcement; fire fighters, health
departments, municipal services (e.g. sewage treatment, water distribution, garbage pick-up, and
the like) and schools would face a funding crisis forcing them to reduce both staff and services.
Plainly, the entire situation would mean that the quality of life would be drastically reduced for
those who remain.
What’s the point?
Why bring up all this information?  Why think about all these dooms day scenarios?
Before beginning that discussion, please allow me to pose another question.  If we had such an
outbreak, where would it begin?  It would likely begin on one or more farms.  How would it get
on those farms?  It could begin because someone was not paying attention to biosecurity on
their farm as they should.  It would spread because others were not paying attention to
biosecurity on their farm.
Now that you know the consequences of such an outbreak, wouldn’t it be nice to prevent
one?  If we cannot prevent it, wouldn’t it be nice to limit the spread of disease so that the impact
on the industry and the economy was minimized?  This is the point: the local economy and the
health of the industry could depend on the biosecurity practices on your farm.  Are the
biosecurity practices on your farm what they should be?  Completing the checklist below should
provide help you assess where you are with respect to basic Biosecurity practices
CONSEQUENCES- continued on next page
Figure 9. Possible Economic Domino 
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YES ✔ NO ✔ QUESTION
Do you limit the access of visitors to your poultry houses?
When authorized visitors enter your poultry houses are they
required to wear disposable boots?
Do you visit the poultry houses of other growers while they
have birds?
Do you share or borrow equipment from other growers?
Are vehicles that have visited other farms allowed to park
near your poultry houses?
Do you bring litter or dead birds from other poultry farms
to your farm?
Have you limited the access of wild animals (particularly
wild birds) to your houses?
Do you spread your litter near other poultry houses?
Are pets allowed access to your poultry houses?
Are wild animals allowed access to dead birds from your
farm?
Is untreated ground water used to water your birds?
An honest answer of “no” to each of these questions indicates that you have taken some
steps to prevent a Biosecurity incident on your farm.  However, even if you can honestly answer
“no” to each of these questions, please do not think you are safe.  You have only begun to
establish an effective Biosecurity program on your farm.  Since each farm represents a unique
set of circumstances, you will undoubtedly face circumstances that no other farm faces.  It is
crucial for the survival of your farm as well as the local economy and, indeed, the health of the
industry, that you be as effective as possible with your Biosecurity program.  How can disease
organisms gain access to the birds in my poultry houses?  This is the tough question that each
poultry grower must address.
 Summary
Exports are vital to the health of the poultry industry.  Yet we could lose those exports with
one major disease outbreak.  Losing exports would hurt both growers and companies since both
have much invested in poultry production.  However, loss of exports would also hurt the local
and (depending on the severity) the national economy.  By practicing sound on-farm Biosecurity
principles, growers protect not only their own economic interests, but those of the local
economy and the national industry.
BIOSECURITY
CHECKLIST
10 AVIAN Advice • WInter 2002 • Vol. 4, No. 4
DISEASE- continued on next page
Foreign Animal Diseases
and the Poultry Industry
F. Dustan Clark, Extension Poultry Health Veterinarian
Center of  Excellence for Poultry Science • University of Arkansas
Introduction
There has been tremendous news coverage of the outbreaks of Foot and Mouth Disease
(FMD) in the United Kingdom recently.  In addition to the outbreaks in the United Kingdom,
there have been FMD outbreaks in Argentina, Uruguay, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the Nether-
lands. .
While FMD does not affect poultry, an outbreak in the United States would affect the
poultry industry because it would restriction movement of animals, supplies, and people in and
out of quarantined areas.  These movement restrictions are designed to prevent spread of the
disease so it can be more easily contained and eliminated.   FMD is one of the diseases that is
considered a  Foreign Animal Disease (FAD). Foreign Animal Diseases FADs are those
diseases which have either never occurred in the United States or have been eradicated from the
United States. Examples of some FADs are: Hog Cholera, African Swine Fever, Dourine,
Glanders, African Horse Sickness, Heartwater Disease, Screwworms, Rinderpest, Avian
Influenza, and Exotic Newcastle Disease (END). There is continued surveillance and vigilance
by the United Stated Department of Agriculture / Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
(USDA / APHIS), private veterinary practitioners, and Foreign Animal Disease Diagnosticians
(FADDs) to prevent these diseases from entering or re-entering the United States.
Exotic Newcastle Disease
Exotic Newcastle Disease (END) is an FAD that can cause devastating losses in the poultry
industry.  Exotic Newcastle Disease (END) can affect many species of domesticated, wild, and
exotic birds and  was first seen in 1926 in Great Britain, Java, and Korea. The name Newcastle
comes from the location where the disease occurred in Great Britain (Newcastle-upon-Tyne).
The disease is present endemically in many countries.
The disease was first reported in the United States in 1944 with other outbreaks reported in
1946 and 1951. However, END was quickly eradicated from the United States. The most serious
recent outbreak in the United States occurred in southern California in 1971 and cost almost 56
million dollars to eradicate.
The causative agent of END is a  Rubulavirus in the family Paramyxoviridae. The virus
can persist in feces for long periods of time and some bird species (parrots and some wild birds)
may be carriers of the virus. Outbreaks of the disease can cause severe losses in a short period of
time. The incubation period for the disease varies from 2-15 days with the incubation period in
chickens being 2-6 days. Clinical symptoms include gasping for air, green watery diarrhea,
coughing, depression, loss of appetite, thin shell misshapen eggs, droopy wings, twisting of the
head and neck, and spasms. Mortality varies with the viral strain and species infected; but may
be high at the initial onset. Lesions observed with the disease include: swelling in the neck
tissues around the trachea, hemorrhages on the tracheal mucosal surface, small pinpoint hemor-
rhages on the inside lining of the proventriculus, hemorrhage  and necrosis of the lymphoid
tissue in the intestines, and hemorrhages in the vent.
A presumptive diagnosis of suspicious for END can be made based upon the symptoms
and lesions. However, since there are no symptoms or lesions exclusive for END. The disease
must be differentiated from similar diseases such as Avian Influenza and fowl cholera by virus
isolation and identification.
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Avian Influenza
Avian Influenza is a highly infectious contagious viral disease of poultry, wild birds
and migratory waterfowl. The disease can range in severity from a mild respiratory trouble  with
little or no mortality to an acute generalized disease with extremely high mortality. The disease
was first described in Italy in the late 1800’s and was referred to as “Fowl Plague”.
The Avian Influenza virus belongs to the Orthomyxoviridae family. These viruses have
two surface antigens known as Hemagglutinin (HA) and Neuraminidase (NA). These two
antigens are used to describe the virus serologically with the  virus designated with the letter H
and N with appropriate numbers.  For instance, the H7N2 virus was the virus present in the
recent outbreak in Virginia.  There are currently 15 H subtypes and 9 N subtypes of the virus.
Avian Influenza is classified as low pathogenic (LPAI) or high pathogenic (HPAI). The deter-
mination of LPAI or HPAI is based on several criteria such as  lethality of the virus in 4-6 week
old susceptible chickens and amino acid sequences at the HA cleavage site. The virus can easily
and quickly mutate from a low pathogenic strain into a high pathogenic strain.
Avian Influenza has a variable incubation period of hours to days depending on the viral
virulence, exposure route, species, dosage and other factors. Usually, the incubation period is 1-
3 days.  The natural routes of exposure to the virus are  respiratory and oral. Clinical signs of the
disease can include: depression, ruffled feathers, loss of appetite, a decrease in egg production,
an increase in water consumption, diarrhea, and respiratory signs such as sneezing, coughing,
and discharges. Lesions associated with the disease will also vary ranging from few if any to
swelling of the head, neck and wattles, hemorrhages in organ systems, necrotic areas in various
organs, hemorrhages on the shanks of the legs, sinusitis, tracheitis and variable amounts of
mortality.
The virus is spread primarily  via direct contact with infected birds or exposure to virus
contaminated materials. Most Avian Influenza strains are low pathogenic and cause few
problems. Historically, most outbreaks of highly pathogenic Avian Influenza started as low
pathogenic outbreaks.
Controlling Foreign Animal Diseases
The best method of disease control is prevention. This is accomplished via Biosecurity
protocols and vigilance for FADDs to prevent entry into the United States.
Currently, there is an Emergency Poultry Diseases Technical Poultry Committee
(EPDTPC) that is developing plans and procedures for handling an outbreak of END or AI if
outbreaks were to occur in Arkansas. This committee is part of the Arkansas Animal Disease
Emergency Response team which was organized by the Arkansas state veterinarian and the
Arkansas Livestock and Poultry Commission.
The EPDTPC organized and conducted Tabletop Exercises in December 2000 and October
2001; other exercises are planned for 2003. The purpose of these exercises is to help in the
development of plans and procedures for handling outbreaks if disease were found in Arkansas
or the United States. These plans are very necessary considering that in 1999 outbreaks of END
occurred in Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, Canada, and New South Wales, Australia.  In the year
2000 there were END outbreaks in Russia and Italy with 231 outbreaks in Italy alone. Costly
Avian Influenza outbreaks have occurred in the USA in 1983-84 and 2002. Vigilance, common
sense, and Biosecurity protocols all can help in the prevention of this disease, other Foreign
Animal Diseases  and more common less devastating diseases.
Summary
Although in recent years the United States has experienced no foreign animal disease
outbreaks, foreign animal diseases have not left the planet so outbreaks are still possible.  An
outbreak of any foreign animal disease would cause hardship on all animal production industries
since the movement of animals, supplies and people would be restricted in quarantine areas.
Exotic Newcastle Disease (END) and Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) are two
foreign animal diseases that can be devastating to poultry.  Prevention is the best method of
disease control.  Foreign animal diseases can be prevented by strict Biosecurity procedures on
each farm and vigilance by animal health professionals charged with preventing the entry of
disease into the United States.
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OUTBREAK- continued on next page
A Short History of the
Cleanup Costs Associated
with Major Disease Out-
breaks in the United States
John Hahn, Veterinary Services
USDA /APHIS
F. Dustan Clark, Extension Poultry Health Veterinarian
Center of  Excellence for Poultry Science • University of Arkansas
Introduction
Before starting our discussion of cleanup costs, it is important to understand some termi-
nology.  While diseases occur all over the world, certain diseases are very deadly to animals and
can spread rapidly.  There is no cure for most of these diseases consequently the most effective
means of control is to destroy infected or exposed animals.  While not popular, this approach
has proved effective in controlling these diseases. However, the approach is effective only
because each country knows what diseases are commonly found within its borders. Diseases
that are not commonly found within the borders are called “foreign animal diseases” (FAD’s).
Major Poultry Disease Outbreaks
Since 1971 there have been two major outbreaks of foreign animal diseases in the United
States and both of these outbreaks have been in poultry.  The first outbreak involved Exotic
Newcastle Disease (or VVND), and the second outbreak involved highly pathogenic Avian
Influenza (AI).  An additional outbreak, which had a major cost was also in poultry. It, however,
was not technically a foreign animal disease since it was classified as low pathogenic Avian
Influenza
Exotic Newcastle Disease
In 1971, a major outbreak of Exotic Newcastle Disease occurred in commercial poultry
flocks in southern California. The United States Department of Agriculture / Animal and Plant
Inspection Service (USDA/APHIS) was asked by the State of California to assist in the eradica-
tion of the disease. The disease threatened not only the California poultry industry but the entire
U.S. poultry and egg supply.  In all, 1,341 infected flocks were identified, and almost 12 million
birds were destroyed.  Eradication efforts cost taxpayers $56 million, severely disrupted the
operations of many producers, and increased the prices of poultry and poultry products to
consumers. This cost of eradication and clean-up also included a total of $27.5 million for bird
indemnity. The outbreak was so severe that nearly four years were required to contain the
disease.  However, Exotic Newcastle has not infected commercial chicken flocks in the United
States since that outbreak was eradicated in 1974.
Exotic Newcastle Disease was also diagnosed in backyard poultry flocks in Southern
California on October 1, 2002.  The California Department of Food and Agriculture and the
USDA/APHIS are presently working to eradicate this disease.  A total of 1,507 backyard flock
premises have been quarantined and infected birds have been found on 351 premises and
destroyed. Although Exotic Newcastle Disease eradication efforts are underway in backyard
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Avian Influenza
The outbreak of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza was in Pennsylvania, Virginia, and
Maryland in 1983 and 1984. USDA/APHIS was also asked to assist in these eradication efforts.
A total of 17 million birds were destroyed and expenses associated with this outbreak totaled
$63 million.  Poultry producers suffered estimated direct losses of $55 million in the form of
lost birds and eggs, but these direct losses were offset by the $40 million in indemnity pay-
ments. Additionally, there were costs associated with cleanup, disinfection, transportation, lost
income, and financial hardships which were not included in the estimate. It has been calculated
that consumers paid about $349 million more for their protein foods during the period Novem-
ber 1983 to  April 1984 because of the outbreak of Avian Influenza.
An additional incident illustrates the unpredictable nature of Avian Influenza. A number of
table-egg farms in Lancaster and Lebanon Counties, PA tested positive for Avian Influenza in
1996 and 1997.  The virus was isolated and said to be nonpathogenic to chickens, but the
outbreak had devastating effects on the local poultry industry.  The virus causes such severe
losses that nine layer flocks were depopulated.  The Pennsylvania Agricultural Department also
imposed a quarantine on a 75-square-mile area restricting movement of poultry or poultry
products into or off of operations in the area of the quarantine until the outbreak was cleaned up.
Why did a supposedly non-pathogenic virus cause losses in chickens?  The Avian Influenza
virus can easily mutate from a non-pathogenic or low pathogenic strain to a highly pathogenic
strain without warning.
An additional major disease outbreak has recently occurred. This outbreak involved low
pathogenic Avian Influenza and occurred in the Shenandoah Valley area of Virginia. The
outbreak spread very quickly and there was great concern that it would mutate to high patho-
genic Avian Influenza as had happened in outbreaks in Mexico, Italy, and Pennsylvania.
Because of this concern, the State of Virginia asked USDA/APHIS to help eradicate the disease.
Positive cases were diagnosed from March12 thru July 3, 2002. The last of the quarantined
farms were released on October 9, 2002. The total costs for this outbreak have not been enumer-
ated as yet. However, the estimates are $13 million for eradication efforts and $50 million for
indemnity payments. The Poultry Federation of Virginia has estimated that the outbreak cost the
poultry industry of Virginia $129 million.
Major Poultry Diseases in Other Countries
It is obvious that disease outbreaks can be costly to eradicate and cleanup. There are also
costs from loss of trade since restrictions are dictated under treaty obligations associated with
the  Office of International Epizootics (OIE).   Currently, OIE lists an outbreak of  Newcastle
Disease  in laying hens in Algeria and an outbreak of Newcastle Disease on 132 premises in
Denmark. Visitors to these countries could transmit the disease to animals in this country if
precautions are not taken.
Summary
Although the United States has not experience the trade
restrictions associated with a foreign disease outbreak, the
possibility always exists.  Costs associated with the eradica-
tion of foreign animal diseases are high, but the costs to the
industry and consumers are even higher.  Constant vigilance is
necessary to protect our animals and our industry.
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BIOSECURITY - continued on next page
F. Dustan Clark, Extension Poultry Health Veterinarian
Center of Excellence for Poultry Science • University of Arkansas
Biosecurity Practices for
Arkansas Livestock Farms
Biosecurity and Best Farm Management
An outbreak of a disease on a farm can cause  loss of animals for sale, production losses,
and extra expenses from veterinary services, quarantine, and/or costs of sanitation and disinfec-
tion. All of these “extra” costs can seriously impede or eliminate farm cash flow and animal
equity.
Biosecurity is the term used for the overall practices and protocols designed to keep disease
off the farm. These measures should be a part of the daily management routine and in essence
are part of the best management practices designed to enhance farm profitability.
Assessing Biosecurity Risks
The first step in developing a Biosecurity program is to assess the “on farm”risks of
disease.  This assessment should be made in consultation with your veterinarian, county agent,
or extension livestock specialist. The assessment allows custom tailoring of a Biosecurity plan
to the individual farm since each farm has differences. However, there are certain practices that
can be utilized on any farm. It is these practices that will be discussed in this paper.
There are many ways in which diseases can gain entry to a livestock farm. The introduction
of new animals to the farm is the greatest risk faced.  Animals returning to the farm from a
location where they have been exposed to other animals offer a risk equally as great. The second
greatest threat is from traffic to and from the farm (people, vehicles, and equipment) which may
inadvertently carry a disease organism onto the farm. Other sources of disease include vermin,
wildlife, and contaminated feed, water, and supplies.
Animals and Animal Movement
The greatest threat of disease introduction comes from new animals being moved to the
farm or animals returning to the farm after being in contact with other animals. The movement
of animals may be a routine occurrence on many farms as animals are moved to and from
exhibitions, sales, auctions, etc, or new animals are obtained to infuse new genetics or blood-
lines. It is best to always attempt to purchase new animals from sources where the health and
disease status are known. In addition, appropriate screening tests (as determined by your
veterinarian or extension specialist) can help limit the addition of animals with some infectious
diseases.   However, remember that tests do have their limits. It is also  important to remember
that an animal may be carrying a disease and not exhibiting any symptoms. Therefore, all new
animals should be quarantined for a period of time after they are purchased . The quarantine
should be at the very least 3-4 weeks (most acute type diseases will become visible within this
time frame) . During this quarantine period the animals should be carefully examined for any
clinical symptoms that are not normal. In addition, other tests can be performed that were not
part of the initial screening and any animal that does become ill can be treated appropriately or
removed. Any returning animal should also go through the quarantine since they may have been
exposed to other animals or diseases. The quarantine area should be isolated away from the
other farm animals and the animals in the quarantine should be checked daily after all other on
farm animals to minimize inadvertent transmission. It is important to wear different clothing,
such as coveralls and rubber or disposable boots,  when caring for the quarantined animals. In
addition, all wastes from the quarantined animals should be isolated from the non-quarantined
The greatest
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animals and any feed or water sources. All equipment used
with the quarantined animals should be thoroughly cleaned
and disinfected before using it with other animals. This
includes any equipment utilized in bringing the animals to the
farm and any used with the animals while in quarantine.
Another important aspect to consider is the disease
resistance status of the animals; both the new additions and
those already on the farm. It is important to have a vaccination
program in place for diseases that are most likely to affect
your animals. This vaccination program works best if it is
customized to your farm. Parasite control and/or preventative
measures are also an important aspect of the animal’s disease
resistance since parasites compete for nutrients and can
weaken the immune system. Additionally, a sound nutritional
program will promote overall health and allow an animal to
better respond to antibiotic therapy and vaccinations.  Finally,
the influence of stress cannot be overlooked; any environment
that  reduces  stress will promote health.
Traffic and Traffic Movement
Traffic to and from the farm (people, vehicles, and
equipment) may inadvertently carry a disease organism onto
the farm. It is therefore very important to minimize traffic or
the potential for traffic to introduce a disease. Visitors to farms
are a necessary part of operating a farm; these visitors can be
veterinarians, livestock specialists, family members, other
livestock owners, utility personnel, or other individuals.
 All visitors can be grouped into the three categories of
minimal or low risk, moderate risk, and high risk. Low risk
visitors are those that rarely visit a farm and  have had no
contact with livestock (such as those from city and/or urban
areas). As such they  present a minimal risk of introducing
disease.  Moderate risk visitors are those that routinely visit
farms, but have no or  only occasional contact with livestock.
This category of visitors includes individuals such as feed
delivery personnel, utility personnel, and farm salespersons.
High risk visitors are those that routinely visit farms and have
direct close contact with livestock. Minimal Biosecurity
measures for all three categories include: 1. no contact with
farm livestock unless absolutely necessary, 2. parking of
vehicles away from the production area of the farm on a
paved, gravel, or concrete area and 3. washing of their hands
before and after entering the premises.
Low risk visitors should practice the minimal security
measures and not bring off farm foods to the farm or enter
areas where contact with livestock could occur. You may wish
to ask them to wear coveralls to prevent contamination of their
clothing . Moderate risk visitors should wear coveralls and
boots if there will be any contact with animals, animal wastes,
feeds, pens, and or equipment in addition to the same things as
low risk visitors. Additionally, they should  and clean and
disinfect their boots and equipment before leaving. High risk
visitors are the greatest risk and should practice all the
minimal measures of Biosecurity and all those things done by
low and high risk visitors. however, they need to take addi-
tional precautions . These additional precautions include
putting on clean boots and coveralls before entering the farm,
using disposable supplies as possible or cleaning and disin-
fecting all equipment before bringing it on the farm, and
cleaning and thoroughly cleaning and disinfecting when
leaving the farm. The use of a footbath should also be consid-
ered as part of the farm Biosecurity plan. The footbath should
be in a suitable container that is water tight and large enough
to allow at least one foot to be placed entirely in it. The
footbath is far more effective if there is some means to remove
debris from the footwear before use of the footbath since
many disinfectants are rendered ineffective if contaminated
with organic matter such as manure. It is important to be sure
and locate the  footbath where it is easily accessible and
practical for use. It is best to have a footbath at  the entrance to
each pen or building. Unfortunately these locations are seldom
practical or utilizable. therefore locate the footbath where
traffic will be from the outside and in areas where the most
susceptible animals are located. .  It is also very important to
properly maintain the disinfectant solutions by cleaning and
recharging at least weekly or more often if used frequently.
Remember a footbath that is improperly used may hinder or
harm a Biosecurity program by giving a false sense of security
or actually spreading disease. All chemicals and disinfectants
used for cleaning, disinfecting, and in footbaths should be
EPA approved and mixed and used according to label direc-
tions.
Ideally, there should be only one farm entrance that can
be gated or closed off to discourage and prevent visitors and
traffic. Vehicles should not be allowed on the farm unless
absolutely necessary. All vehicles should be parked on an area
of concrete, asphalt, etc. so the wheels and undercarriage can
be properly cleaned and  disinfected and there is minimal
contact with dirt, mud, farm drainage,  and/or animal wastes.
If this is not possible at least park on an area of grass.  Ideally
all  vehicles should be cleaned and disinfected before arrival at
and upon leaving a farm. Additionally, some type of insecti-
cidal spray should be used in the vehicle before leaving.  Farm
equipment should not be loaned to other farms if at all
possible. If this is not possible the equipment should be
thoroughly cleaned and properly disinfected before returning
to the farm or use with other animals. All supplies that are
non-disposable should be cleaned and disinfected after each
animal. Another important point about traffic (both vehicular
and personnel) is traffic flow patterns. It is always best
(because of differences in immunity and susceptibility ) to
visit the youngest animals first then progress age-wise to the
oldest. All quarantined and/or sick animals should be checked
last.
Summary
Disease outbreaks can reduce farm efficiency and profits.
Effective Biosecurity programs can reduce the risk of disease
outbreaks.  Effective Biosecurity programs reduce the prob-
ability that diseases will gain entrance to the farm.  Animals
and animal movement is the greatest biosecurity risk farms
face, while traffic (people, vehicles and equipment) to and
from the farm  can transmit disease.
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The Office of International
Epizootics
F. Dustan Clark, Extension Poultry Health Veterinarian
Center of Excellence for Poultry Science • University of Arkansas
Background
In 1920 Rinderpest, a deadly and highly infectious viral disease of cattle, was found in
cattle from India being held in Belgium for shipment to Brazil.  While swift action could have
limited the disease, the inevitable slowness of negotiations using diplomatic channels between
nations allowed the disease to spread and hampered eradication efforts.  Realizing their predica-
ment,  the founding 28 countries created the Office of International Epizootics or OIE in 1924.
The OIE is headquartered in Paris and held it’s first session in 1927.  Since this beginning;
membership in the OIE has grown and the stature of the organization has as well.  The OIE
presently includes 162 member countries.
Operating Procedures
The International Committee, which is composed of delegates from member countries, is
the controlling body of OIE.  The International Committee holds a general meeting every year
in Paris for the purpose of adopting international trade standards and resolutions related to
animal health or animal disease control.  Additional business conducted at the general meeting
includes: election of members to governing bodies or commissions, appointing the OIE Director
General, approving annual activity reports and authorizing budgets. The general meeting also
allows delegates to discuss regional problems and report on the worldwide animal health
situation.
Meeting OIE Objectives
OIE members agree to strive toward four objectives.  First, member countries agree to tell
the truth about what diseases have been found in their countries so that other countries can
protect themselves.  Second, members agree to analyze their own disease situation and share
that data with other members in an effort to help each other understand how to control these
diseases.  Third, members agree help each other learn how to control and eradicate diseases.
Fourth and last members agree to develop standards for protection of member countries without
erecting trade barriers. This standard is called the International Animal Health Code (AHC). The
World Trade Organization recognizes the AHC of the OIE as international sanitary rules.
How does OIE accomplish its objectives? This is done via OIE’s world animal health
information system through which member countries declare current animal diseases and
zoonoses (diseases that are transmitted from animals to man) in their respective countries.  OIE
information can be viewed at http://www.oie.int/eng/oie/en_oie.htm.   Diseases reported to the
OIE are classified into two categories: List A and List B.
Disease Classifications
List A diseases are transmissible diseases that have the potential for very serious and rapid
spread, irrespective of national borders, that are of serious socio-economic or public health
consequence and that are of major importance in the international trade of animals and animal
products. List B diseases are diseases that are transmissible, are considered to be of socio-
economic and/or public health importance within the reporting countries, and that are significant
in the international trade of animals and animal products.  While important enough to be
tracked, List B diseases tend to be those that spread less easily and are controlled more readily.
EPIZOOTICS - continued on next page
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Trade and Economic Effects of OIE
Members also agree to abide by the International Animal Health Code which states:
“International trade in animals and animal products depends on a combination of factors which
should be taken into account to ensure unimpeded trade, without incurring un acceptable risks to
human and animal health.”
As a part of this trade agreement certain countries that meet the criteria are declared “disease
free” for List A diseases.  When a country has a “disease free” status, unimpeded trade can
proceed with that country.  However, if a List A disease is discovered in a “disease free”
country, trade is restricted with that country so that the disease can be controlled.  Unimpeded
trade can resume with the affected country six months after the last positive has been discov-
ered.  Although, this procedure is needed and necessary, it has economic consequences.  These
consequences are outlined in another article.
The List A and List B diseases for avians are listed below:
List A List B
• Newcastle disease • Avian chlamydiosis
• Highly pathogenic avian • Avian infectious bronchitis
   influenza
• Avian infectious
   laryngotracheitis
• Avian mycoplasmosis
   (M. gallisepticum)
• Avian tuberculosis
• Duck virus enteritis




• Infectious bursal disease
   (Gumboro disease)
• Marek’s disease
• Pullorum disease
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Integrity and Rules of
Practice for Veterinarians
F. Dustan Clark, Extension Poultry Health Veterinarian
Center of Excellence for Poultry Science • University of Arkansas
Veterinarians Oath
We probably all realize that, once they have completed their training, veterinarians must
pass state board examinations and are required to take an oath.  That oath is as follows:
Being admitted to the profession of veterinary medicine, I solemnly swear to use my
scientific knowledge and skills for the benefit of society through the protection of
animal health, the relief of animal suffering, the conservation of livestock resources,
the promotion of public health and the advancement of medical knowledge.
I will practice my profession conscientiously, with dignity and in keeping with the
principles of veterinary medical ethics.
I accept as a lifelong obligation the continual improvement of my professional knowl-
edge and competence.
Regulations Veterinarians Must Follow and Why
Most veterinarians honor the personal commitment they make upon taking their oath,
maintaining the integrity of the profession.  However, as the oath implies,  veterinarians, like
other professionals, have rules to obey and are expected maintain their competency.  Veterinar-
ians are expected to obey the same regulations that any other citizen of the United States must
obey.  However, there are also additional regulations that apply only to the practice of veterinary
medicine. Veterinarians who do not follow these regulations are punished and could have their
licence to practice within the state revoked.
In the United States the veterinary profession is regulated in each state by a state Veterinary
Medical Board, which enforces a set of regulations known as the Veterinary Practice Act.
While specific regulations found in the Veterinary Practice Act may vary slightly from state to
state, regulations, and policies are similar. Regulations are usually set forth by the legislative
body of the state(i.e. the state house or senate) and are established to define the practice of
veterinary medicine in the state, establish a veterinary board, and establish penalties for the
illegal practice of veterinary medicine.  Some of the duties of the veterinary board may include:
examining to determine the qualifications of applicants to practice in the state, issue of veteri-
nary licenses, investigate complaints against veterinarians, and enforce the provisions of the
Veterinary Practice Act.
Consequences for Violating Regulations
The Veterinary Practice Act is designed to protect the general public and their animals by
insuring that licensed, qualified veterinarians are properly engaged in the practice of veterinary
medicine.  The practice act outlines a code of professional conduct for veterinarians to follow.
Any veterinarian that violates the rules of the practice act is investigated by the veterinary board
and may be issued a citation, temporary suspension of their license or a revocation of their
license to practice.  Unprofessional conduct, such as conviction of a felony, negligence, animal
cruelty, dishonesty, and a host of other behaviors are all grounds for investigation and punish-
ment.
INTEGRITY - continued on next page
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The diagnosis of disease in an animal by a veterinarian is also somewhat regulated by the
agency responsible for the control of animal diseases in the state. This agency  issues a list of
diseases that are considered reportable within the state. A “reportable disease” in one that
veterinarians are required to report to the agency in charge of animal disease control. These
diseases are those that have the potential to be communicable to people, are easily spread, or are
a foreign animal disease (ie. one not endemic to the United States). A few examples of report-
able diseases are rabies, Brucellosis, Tuberculosis, Avian Influenza, Exotic Newcastle, Anthrax,
and Hog Cholera. In most states a veterinarian is legally obligated to report any disease listed as
reportable in that state or the United States if the disease is even suspected in an affected animal.
In other words, the veterinarian must report the disease even if he/she suspects the disease is
present and has not definitively diagnosed the disease.  Once reported, certain diseases may lead
to animals being quarantined until the disease can be contained.  Although such quarantines can
be inconvenient for producers and processors, regulations may require veterinarians to issue
these orders.
Summary
Veterinarians are bound by honor bound to uphold their oath and the regulations within the
states that grant them licences to practice. The oath as well as the regulations are designed to
protect health of the public, the health of animals, the food supply and to prevent deadly and
costly disease outbreaks. In addition, these oath and the regulations insure that a veterinarian is
practicing with a certain level of knowledge, and professional conduct.
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